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The day before the shutdown I went into our daughters’ school to teach philosophy. A number of 
teachers were absent, either because they had underlying health conditions or because they lived 
with people who did. Many of the children were absent too. The teachers were busy photocopying 
worksheets, trying to figure out what would be required of them in the coming days and weeks. I 
went in to add an extra pair of hands, to feel I was being useful. Each class, from reception to year 
six, came to me in turn. We sat in a circle on the floor and talked. One exercise involved a chair 
and a story about aliens who came down to our planet, took the chair, and started to wear it on 
their heads (an idea borrowed from Peter Worley’s The If Machine: Philosophical enquiry in the 
classroom, 2010). Is it a chair? Is it a hat? Is it a chair being used as a hat? One year six told me that 
Slinkys had been designed for use as springs in factories but are still a toy because you play with 
them. A year three told me that she could sit on her sister but that doesn’t make her a chair. They 
fizzed with ideas and laughter. The next day we all withdrew into our homes. 
 
Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy begins with a withdrawal. The meditator isolates himself 
in a warm room, free of all distractions, so that he can properly examine his beliefs and identify 
those that will form the firm foundation for his philosophy. There he stays for six days, with no 
leave for exercise, shopping or medically required travel. There he reflects on his beliefs, on God, 
and on nature, and there he comes to realize his essence as a thinking thing. Descartes’s philosophy 
begins in quarantine. It begins in social isolation. 
 
Feminist critics have alighted on this starting point, the fantasy of isolation, the privileging of the 
mind above the body, the insistence that knowledge can be achieved all on one’s own. These are 
indicators of a certain mindset, it is said, one that bakes into its starting point the conclusions it 
aims to draw. But someone must be doing the shopping, someone must be lighting the fire. Mary 
Midgley wrote an essay for BBC Radio in the 1950s which was more specific in complaint: 
Descartes’s problem, she said, was that he was a childless bachelor. For only someone without a 
family would think of isolation as the starting point for philosophical reflection. Her essay was 
rejected by the editor as a “trivial, irrelevant intrusion of domestic matters into intellectual life”. 
 
Those of us at home with children at the moment cannot avoid the “irrelevant intrusion of 
domestic matters into intellectual life”. A conversation with a colleague about some nicety of Kant 
was interrupted by my daughter screaming “That’s not fair!” outside the bedroom door. The few 
books I have brought home snuggle up against Monopoly, marble run and Lego. My attempts at 
reading and writing are punctuated by the making of snacks, the settling of disputes, the sound of 
children’s television. Withdrawal from the world is not much of a withdrawal when some of the 
world comes with you. 
 
Midgley thought that the absence of the family from philosophical thinking was a problem for 
philosophy, and that Descartes’s philosophical views would not have survived close contact with 
the messy reality of small bodies that place demands on your own. “For anybody living intimately 
with [another] as a genuine member of a family”, she wrote in the rejected essay “Rings and Books” 
(now available at www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk), “Cogito would be Cogitamus; their 
consciousness would be every bit as certain as his own”. Having children, she said elsewhere, is 
extremely valuable when one comes to talk about the difference between people and animals. 
Perhaps she meant that children are a reminder that our intellectual pursuits have to be earned just 
as much as walking and using cutlery. Midgley’s reflections present children as the bump in the 
carpet that reveals the fundamental flaws in grand philosophical visions. 
 
This is one way to make the family intrude on philosophical theorizing, as a counter-example to 
the crude distinctions that philosophers have made. But it presents too limited an intrusion. Our 
thinking about children often does involve compromise, and it would not be a surprise if children 
straddled some of our dichotomies. Sometimes they are to be held responsible; sometimes they are 
to be accommodated. That doesn’t show that no distinction can be drawn between things that we 
hold responsible and things that we accommodate. It shows only that the borders are fuzzy, and 
that it is in these borders that children reside. Children complicate our stories. But this doesn’t 
show that the stories are wrong. It shows only that they need supplementation. 
 
More interesting would be a philosophy that started with children, not as a liminal concern but as 
objects of philosophical inquiry in their own right. Yet it’s hard to know what this would look like. 
It lies deep in our ordinary thinking that children represent a temporary stage in the development 
of a lifeform whose natural endpoint is the reason-endowed mature human adult. And that tempts 
us to think of the goods of childhood as comprehensible only in light of the goods that are found 
in the life of a fully functioning adult. We think of adulthood as the point of childhood and the 
role of education to equip children with the skills and knowledge required to live as an adult. This 
is why those of us who are homeschooling reach so desperately for phonics and maths apps, 
wanting our children to be prepared for what is to come. What would it be to reject this way of 
thinking? It would force us to value childhood on its own terms, not as a route to something more 
valuable, but as important in and of itself. This would be the intrusion of domestic matters in the 
form of a wrecking ball, not complicating philosophical theory but knocking it down and forcing 
it to be built somewhere else. 
 
Still, even this more extreme intrusion is limited in its own way, since it forces us to change only 
the content of our philosophical views. This is Midgley’s point: Descartes’s ideas need amending, 
she claims, in light of truths that are obvious to those who live with families rather than isolate 
from them. Say this is right about what Descartes said; it doesn’t affect the fact that it was his social 
isolation that enabled him to say it. Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia points this out to Descartes 
during their correspondence: “the life I am constrained to lead does not permit me enough time 
at my disposal to acquire a habit of meditation according to your rules”. The “interests of my 
house, which I must not neglect, … the conversations and amusements that I cannot evade” 
prevent her from finding the time and space that the Meditations suggest are needed to achieve 
philosophical insight. 
 
Social isolation has given me the clear stretch of time that Descartes says is required to do 
philosophy. Teaching has been cancelled or moved online; birthday parties have been abandoned; 
the spare bedroom is warm enough once I wrap a blanket round my shoulders. But disciplined 
reflection is difficult, and more so when one is surrounded by those who have a claim on one’s 
time and attention. In his reply to Princess Elisabeth, Descartes modifies his demand, telling her 
that she need only devote a few hours each day to “thoughts which occupy imagination”. Easier, 
perhaps, but still no state-sanctioned walk in the park. 
 
The problem here is more demanding than that envisioned by Midgley. It suggests that although 
we can do the philosophy of children, we cannot do philosophy with children, because being with 
children is incompatible with the disciplined attention required for serious intellectual work. It is 
right that children have rarely been the object of philosophical attention, but even if that changed, 
and even if that would be a change for the better, it would only allow the family into the content 
of our philosophical thinking. It would not make the family part of its method. Philosophy with 
children can seem like a school sports day, or the weddings that young children dress up and enact 
when stuck in the house: innocent in and of itself, enjoyable even, but fundamentally a pastiche of 
something that has significance only in the life of a mature, fully functioning adult. 
 
So what was I doing with those children while we waited for the schools to close? We were certainly 
playing, with ideas, with stories, with words. And if serious intellectual work requires attention 
and dedication, then we were not thinking. For we were too distractible, too easily amused by the 
world and each other. But our playing was not unconnected with the kind of reflection that 
Descartes undertakes, just as the egg-and-spoon race is not unconnected with the 800m sprint. In 
neither case should we think of the adult activity as the perfection of something that is engaged in 
badly by the child. But nor should we think of them as only mimicking the form of the adult 
enterprise, as if they were pretend weddings. Talking philosophy with children is its own activity 
but it can change into disciplined reflection, not by becoming more perfect but in the way that 
spring turns into summer, giving rise to something different but no more, or less, valuable for all 
that. 
 
When does playing with ideas become intellectual work? Descartes’s Meditations is self-consciously 
a meditation, “a deep consideration, careful examination, studious casting, or devising of things in 
the mind” as Cotgrave’s French–English dictionary of 1611 has it. And just as spiritual meditation 
involves a series of reflective exercises designed to reorientate one’s attention away from oneself 
and onto God, so too does Descartes’s philosophical meditation involve a series of philosophical 
exercises designed to reorientate one’s attention from the senses to the true nature of mind, world 
and God. These exercises were designed to take our natural aptitude for thought, to channel it and 
to inculcate habits of attention. This is difficult. It is time-consuming. It is also deeply, deeply 
boring. And this was surely its point, for it is only by going slowly that the mind can be led away 
from itself to God and the truth. 
 
Boredom is a constant for our children during self-isolation. It is a constant for us. We miss our 
friends, we miss the pub, we miss the conversations, the touching and the breathing. We know, 
now as ever, that boredom is far from the worst that people will experience during this pandemic. 
Descartes reminds us that boredom can also be a privilege. For boredom allows the mind to 
wander, to rest on an idea longer than it would otherwise have done, to start off on a road which 
leads to habits of attention. It is Descartes’s attentive thinking which leads him to God and, 
through God, out of isolation and back to the world. Our return is less triumphal, the world’s 
contours encroaching only slowly in worry, anger, and confusion. But while we wait on its 
approach, the boredom remains. And this is one way in which isolation with the family can give 
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